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Note
Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate:
Protecting the Off-Campus First
Amendment Freedoms of
Students
Thomas v. Board of Education, 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3536 (U.S. Feb. 19,
1980) (No. 79-1021).
It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their consti-
tutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District1
Perhaps it would be well if those entrusted to administer the teaching of
American history and government to our students began their efforts by
practicing the document on which that history and government are based.




The vital function served by a system of public education can-
not, rationally, be questioned. Education serves as "a principal in-
strument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment."3 For schools to operate effectively,
a limited abrogation of students' first amendment 4 rights is
1. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
2. 462 F.2d 960, 978 (5th Cir. 1972).
3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I reads:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
The first amendment is made applicable to the states by section one of the
fourteenth amendment, which reads, in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
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a necessity.5 However, these rights are such that students cannot
be subjected to whatever action school officials feel is appropriate.6
While "there is no denying that the child's speech right is different
in kind as well as degree from the right of free speech possessed
by adults,"'7 the student nevertheless has a right to freedom of ex-
pression, which is part of "the fundamentally just claim all chil-
dren have against the state-that it should respect and leave open
the possibilities of choice that they will have on reaching matur-
ity."
8
Thomas v. Board of Education9 was one of a number of student
publication cases considered by federal courts during the years
1969 through 1979. Unlike the bulk of those cases, however,
Thomas confronted the Second Circuit Court of Appeals with the
question whether suspensions constitutionally could be imposed
upon high school students who produced, almost entirely off-cam-
pus, what some might regard as an objectionable unofficial publi-
cation, and who did not actively distribute the publication on
school grounds. 10 The punishments imposed were held not to have
withstood the first amendment's proscription." This note will ana-
lyze the Thomas decision, focusing on high school students' free-
dom to produce essentially off-campus publications having limited
connection with the school, and the propriety of inhibitory inter-
vention on the part of school officials. 12
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
at 507. Mr. Justice Fortas stressed the need for comprehensive authority of
state and school officials to control in-school conduct, but added that the ex-
ertion of such control must be "consistent with fundamental constitutional
safeguards." Id. See also Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1049 (2d
Cir. 1979), where Chief Judge Kaufman noted that education could not flour-
ish if teachers could not place sanctions on incorrect responses or substan-
dard work, and could not silence those who speak out of turn and disrupt the
classroom or library atmosphere.
6. See, e.g., Shanley v. Northeast Independent Community School Dist., 462 F.2d
960, 967 (5th Cir. 1972); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTITUTIONAL LAw 690 (1978);
Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L REV. 321, 350 (1979).
7. Garvey, supra note 6, at 339.
8. Id.
9. 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979).
10. Id. at 1045-46.
11. Id. at 1050.
12. The right of the college or university student to engage in such activity is
beyond the scope of this note. Because of factors such as the college stu-
dent's age and increased maturity in comparison to the typical high school
student, courts and commentators have agreed that less restrictive standards
are to be applied at the university level, allowing for generally more exten-
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II. A DECADE'S PERSPECTIVE
While first amendment doctrine teaches that courts must main-
tain a skeptical attitude concerning government claims that state
imposed restrictions on expression are constitutionally permissi-
ble,13 the first amendment's umbrella is not protective of all
speech.14 The courts traditionally have paid considerable defer-
ence to school officials in terms of the discipline imposed in and
control exerted over their respective schools, thus reflecting judi-
cial reluctance to interfere in the day-to-day operation of the pub-
lic schools.15 This hesitancy to intervene is set aside when there
arises the danger that fundamental freedoms, such as the freedom
of expression, may be infringed impermissibly. 16 Since 1969, fed-
eral courts have been faced with a number of cases in which secon-
dary school students have alleged that school policies and school
officials' actions concerning student publications, both officially
recognized and "underground" publications,' 7 denied them pro-
sive rights of expression for such students. See, e.g., Baughman v.
Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir. 1973); Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d
54, 58 (4th Cir. 1971); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 808 n.5 (2d
Cir. 1971); Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Wright,
The Constitution on Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1052-53 (1969).
Additionally, this note deals only with the regulation of students' off-
campus first amendment rights. Administrators appear to be more free to
intervene where a student's off-campus conduct is not speech-oriented and
has an adverse effect on school discipline and/or the welfare of students than
where speech is involved. See Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 1124, 1128 (1973). See also
E. REUTTER, THE COURTS AND STUDENT CONDUCT 3 (1975).
13. Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 1979).
14. The case of High O1' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 456 F. Supp. 1035, 1039 (N.D. Ga.
1978), provides an excellent compilation of the exceptions to first amend-
ment-protected speech. Listed by the court are: obscene material [citing
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)]; fighting words [citing Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)]; defamation [citing Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)]; intolerable invasions of privacy [citing
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)]; classroom disruption
[citing Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969)]; incitement to imminent lawless activity [citing Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) ]; and solicitation of illegal activity [citing Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973)].
15. See, e.g., Shanley v. Northeast Independent Community School Dist., 462 F.2d
960, 967 (5th Cir. 1972); Hernandez v. Hanson, 430 F. Supp. 1154, 1156 (D. Neb.
1977).
16. Hernandez v. Hanson, 430 F. Supp. 1154 (D. Neb. 1977).
17. "Underground" publications are generally student-created and produced and
are not recognized as official school publications. They are generally directed
toward students and may or may not be intended for distribution on school
property. Frequently they contain matter critical of school policies and offi-
cials, along with other material of such nature that the authors feel would not
be published in an officially recognized student publication because of ad-
ministrative pressure not to publish such material.
[Vol. 59:790
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tected rights of expression and chilled the exercise thereof. These
cases have presented the courts with the difficult task of weighing
the students' first amendment claims and protecting the legitimate
exercise of guaranteed rights, while keeping in mind the necessity
of an orderly school environment conducive to learning.18 Some
analysis of the cases setting the stage for the Thomas decision is
necessary.
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 19
began the influx of students' rights cases in the ten years prior to
Thomas. Tinker remains the leading case in the area of students'
first amendment freedoms. The plaintiffs in Tinker were secon-
dary school students who had worn armbands during the school
day as a peaceful protest of United States involvement in the Viet-
nam conflict, and were suspended from school for contravening an
administrative policy-by refusing to remove the armbands.20 The
Court held that in the absence of a showing that the expression
would materially and substantially interfere with maintenance of
appropriate discipline in the school, the expression could not be
prohibited.2 1 What has become known as the Tinker test was for-
mulated:
[Clonduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason-
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior-materially dis-
rupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights
of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech.
2 2
This test would appear to be met by a showing of actual disorder
and disruption, or a showing of "facts which might reasonably have
led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption... or ma-
terial interference" with the operation of the school.23
18. See note 5 & accompanying text supra.
19. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
20. Id. at 504.
21. Id. at 509. The court borrowed the language used in its holding from an ear-
lier Fifth Circuit case, Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966), in which
a school disciplinary regulation prohibiting the wearing of so-called "freedom
buttons" advocating the exercise of the right to vote was found to be arbitrary
and unreasonable and therefore an infringement of first amendment rights.
Id. at 748-49. The Burnside court held that school administrators cannot in-
terfere with students' rights of expression "where the exercise of such rights
in the school building and schoolrooms do [sic] not materially and substan-
tially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the opera-
tion of the school." Id. at 749.
22. 393 U.S. at 513.
23. Id. at 514. See also Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 58-59 (4th Cir. 1971) (case
indicating that school officials need not wait to intervene until actual disrup-
tion or interference occurs, so long as facts which provided some basis for a
reasonable forecast of such disruption or interference can be demonstrated);
Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1049 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (same).
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The Tinker approach suggests that "undifferentiated fear or ap-
prehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to
freedom of expression. '24 Similarly, a desire on the part of school
officials to avoid "the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint" 25 or "an urgent wish to avoid
the controversy which might result from the expression" 26 cannot
serve as justification for administrative curtailment of first amend-
ment rights.27
Commentators have indicated that while the Tinker test is rec-
ognized as determinative in a freedom of expression case involving
students, there is disagreement among courts concerning the defi-
nition and scope of the Tinker test:
General agreement on the appropriate verbal formula merely serves to
hide a fundamental disagreement about its meaning. One approach has
been to treat the 'threat of material and substantial disruption, like the
'clear and present danger' test developed in sedition cases, and to require
a rather high probability of serious disruption before expression may be
curtailed. Most courts have been willing to allow greater leeway to the
determinations of school administrators, demanding that the finding be
not 'clear and present,' but merely a 'reasonable forecast' before expres-
sion may be restricted.2 8
The real value of the Tinker decision lies in its implicit message
that school officials cannot arbitrarily, unreasonably, and without
sufficient justification, curtail students' rights of free expression. 29
With cases such as Scoville v. Board of Education,30 the Tinker
24. 393 U.S. at 508.
25. Id. at 509.
26. Id. at 510.
27. See Shanley v. Northeast Independent Community School Dist., 462 F.2d at
970, 972 n.10. For the view that the Tinker holding would lead to dire conse-
quences for effective discipline in schools, see Justice Black's strong dissent
in Tinker. 393 U.S. at 515-26 (Black, J., dissenting).
28. Garvey, supra note 6, at 352 (footnotes omitted). For formulations and refor-
mulations of versions of the "clear and present danger" test alluded to by
Professor Garvey, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
29. See Letwin, Regulation of Underground Newspapers on Public School Cam-
puses in California, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 141, 144 (1974). Professor Letwin ad-
vocates an expansive reading of Tinker.
An enlightened decision like Tinker cannot alone do the job. If its
promise is to be realized, it must be accompanied by a refusal to tol-
erate any denial of rights based merely on unadorned proclamations
that children are immature, in need of protection from themselves or
from others, or simply that they are 'different.'
Id. (footnote omitted).
30. 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970). In Scoville, the court
found that a violation of students' first and fourteenth amendment rights oc-
curred when they were expelled for publishing an unofficial student newspa-
per critical of the school administration. The school officials' action could not
[Vol. 59:790
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principle was extended into the realm of student publication cases.
A significant number of the student publication cases during the
past decade involved a further extension of the Tinker rule and
rationale. 31 At the heart of these cases was the alleged invalidity
of school policies requiring administrative approval of publications
prior to distribution on school grounds. The central argument was
that such policies constituted unconstitutional forms of prior re-
straints,32 going well beyond reasonable time, place, and manner
regulations-restrictions on speech which must be respected.33
One of the dangers of a prior restraint system is that items of ex-
pression may be censored arbitrarily on the basis of intended con-
tent. Once an arm of the state goes beyond the enforcement of
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions and begins regu-
lating expression on the basis of content, the actions rest on shaky
constitutional ground.34
Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education35 established the pre-
vailing view that policies requiring administrative approval prior to
the distribution of written material on campus are not unconstitu-
tional per se,3 6 because the school system "has authority to mini-
mize or eliminate influences that would dilute or disrupt the
effectiveness of the educational process as the state conceives
it.''37 While the Eisner court recognized that prior restraint sys-
tems in high schools may pass constitutional muster, it found the
particular policy being considered constitutionally deficient for its
failure to prescribe a definite, short period within which adminis-
trative review of the submitted material had to be completed and a
decision made concerning distribution.38 Obtaining a judicial de-
cree would not, however, be necessary because such a require-
be justified under the Tinker standard. Id. at 13-14. For a discussion of the
Tinker standard, see notes 21-28 & accompanying text supra.
31. See, e.g., Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975); Baughman v.
Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973); Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460
F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972); Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971); Eis-
ner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971).
32. A prior restraint system is presumptively unconstitutional, and the state
bears an extremely heavy burden in an attempt to justify such drastic action.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (the "Pentagon
Papers" case). The prevention of prior restraints on publication has been
called the chief purpose of the first amendment. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 713 (1931).
33. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); Healy v. James, 408
U.S. 169, 192-93 (1972); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972).
34. Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir. 1973).
35. 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971).
36. Id. at 805.
37. Id. at 807.
38. Id. at 810.
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ment could seriously disrupt the educational process. 3 9
A concise statement of the requirements of a constitutionally
permissible prior approval system in high schools was supplied by
the Fourth Circuit in Baughman v. Freienmuth.40 To be valid, the
system must clearly spell out what expression is forbidden; define
the term "distribution" and its application to different kinds of ma-
terial; provide for a prompt decision concerning whether the sub-
mitted material may be distributed; provide for a prompt appeals
procedure in the event of a decision adverse to student interests;
and include a statement of what happens in the event of the ad-
ministration's failure to act promptly.4 1 The principles of Eisner
and Baughman-recognizing that constitutional prior approval
systems for high schools can be devised-represent the majority
view among federal courts considering the question.42
The position taken in Eisner and Baughman has not met with
universal approval from courts and commentators. The court in
Fufishima v. Board of Education,43 expressly rejected prior ap-
proval systems, calling Eisner and its progeny the results of misap-
plications of Tinker.44 According to the court, the reference in
Tinker to facts supporting a reasonable forecast of material and
39. Id.
40. 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973).
41. Id. at 1351. Presumably the policy's statement concerning forbidden expres-
sion must comport with the Tinker test, as well as current constitutional stan-
dards pertaining to obscenity and defamation. The Baughman court noted
that "a regulation imposing prior restraint must be much more precise than a
regulation imposing post-publication sanctions." Id. at 1349. This implies
that if the policy being considered merely mouths the words of the Tinker
test, the policy may not have the necessary precision and specificity. Such a
finding was made by the court in Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs, 490 F.2d
601, 605 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 417 U.S. 929 (1974), vacated as moot, 420
U.S. 128 (1975). Additionally, mere inclusion of the terms "libelous" and "ob-
scene" does not necessarily provide sufficient precision:
[W]hile school authorities may ban obscenity and unprivileged
libelous material [assuming constitutional standards are met] there
is an intolerable danger, in the context of prior restraint, that under
the guise of such vague labels they may unconstitutionally choke off
criticism, either of themselves, or of school policies, which they find
disrespectful, tasteless, or offensive. That they may not do.
Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d at 1351.
42. See Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 382-84 (4th Cir. 1975); Quarterman v. Byrd,
453 F.2d 54, 59 (4th Cir. 1971); Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1049-50
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that even in the absence of written policies school
officials may require prior approval, but recognizing that in the absence of
written policies concerning approval before distribution, administrators' ac-
tions in suppressing particular material must be scrutinized very carefully);
Leibner v. Sharbaugh, 429 F. Supp. 744, 748-49 (E.D. Va. 1977); Pliscou v.
Holtville Unified School Dist., 411 F. Supp. 842, 849-50 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
43. 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972).
44. Id. at 1358.
[Vol. 59:790
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substantial disruption or interference with school operation 4 5
should not be read as an authorization of any system of prior re-
straint. Instead, according to Fujishima, the Tinker forecast rule
"is properly a formula for determining when the requirements of
school discipline justify punishment of students" for exercising
rights of expression.46 While Fujishima has not received signifi-
cant judicial approval, its bold rejection of prior restraint systems
in high schools would meet with the approval of commentators
who denounce such systems in the public schools.47
In Trachtman v. Anker,48 a Second Circuit case decided before
Thomas v. Board of Education,49 the court employed the Tinker
test in a manner different from past applications. In Trachtman,
staff members of the school newspaper sought administrative ap-
proval to distribute in school a questionnaire surveying the sexual
attitudes, preferences, knowledge, and experience of ninth
through twelfth grade students, with the objective of publishing
the questionnaire's results in the school newspaper.50 The court
held that denial of permission to distribute the questionnaire was
constitutional since there was a reasonable basis for the school of-
ficials' belief that the questionnaire could cause significant emo-
tional harm to some students.51 While most applications of Tinker
45. See note 23 & accompanying text supra.
46. 460 F.2d at 1358. For a case holding that a state statute had not authorized the
promulgation of administrative policies concerning approval prior to distribu-
tion in schools, but that the legislature was not constitutionally prohibited
from enacting such a statute, see Bright v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.,
18 Cal. 3d 450, 464, 556 P.2d 1090, 1099, 134 Cal. Rptr. 639, 648 (1976).
47. See Letwin, supra note 29, at 168, wherein the author advocates the position
that courts feeling it necessary to sanction prior approval systems should re-
quire "the full panoply" of protection seen in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S.
51 (1965), including a requirement that school administrators seeking to pro-
hibit distribution of written material initiate judicial review. Freedman,
which dealt with the regulation of allegedly objectionable movies, established
that the following procedural safeguards were necessary in order to avoid an
unconstitutional prior restraint: (1) the censor has the burden of showing
that the expression is unprotected; (2) any restraint imposed prior to a judi-
cial determination can only be for a brief period in order to preserve the sta-
tus quo; and (3) a prompt final judicial determination must be assured. Id. at
58-59. In the same context of procedural safeguards, see also Southeast Pro-
motions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975). The procedural safeguards
discussed in Eisner and Baughman appear to be patterned after the Freed-
man requirements, but are a watered-down version designed to be more ap-
propriate for the school setting. See notes 38-41 & accompanying text supra.
For another commentator's view that prior restraints simply are not author-
ized by Tinker, see Note, Prior Restraints in Public High Schools, 82 YALE L.
J. 1325, 1334 (1973).
48. 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978).
49. 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979).
50. 563 F.2d at 514-15.
51. Id. at 519-20.
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have focused on the "material and substantial" interference or dis-
ruption portion of the test, Trachtman evidenced an apparent reli-
ance on the portion of the Tinker test referring to interference with
the rights of others.52 Commentators have protested Trachtman
because it is seen as a "deep bow" to the wisdom of school admin-
istrators and as condonation of prior restraint upon the mere
showing of speculative harm to what may be only a few students. 53
Only a limited number of cases during the ten years prior to
Thomas dealt with or made reference to school officials' authority
to regulate expression which was conducted essentially off-cam-
pus but had some effect on or relationship with the school environ-
ment.54 These cases are discussed in a later section.55
I. THE FACTS OF THOMAS
Four high school students of Granville Junior-Senior High
School in Granville, a small town in upstate New York, produced a
satirical publication directed to the school community and pat-
terned after the nationally-known magazine, National Lampoon.
School topics were satirized in the publication, which was entitled
Hard Times.5 6 Additionally, an editorial on masturbation and arti-
cles making reference to prostitution, sodomy, and castration were
included. A banner across the cover of Hard Times described the
contents as "uncensored, vulgar, immoral.15 7  The students
worked, according to the court, almost exclusively off-campus and
after school hours in producing their publication. An occasional
52. '"The First Amendment right to express one's views does not include the right
to importune others to respond to questions when there is reason to believe
that such importuning may result in harmful consequences." Id. See also
note 22 & accompanying text supra.
53. Diamond, Interference With the Rights of Others: Authority to Restrict Stu-
dents'First Amendment Rights, 8 J. L. & EDUC. 347, 355-56 (1979); Comment,
Behind the Schoolhouse Gate: Sex and the Student Pollster, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV.
161, 163-64 (1979); Note, The First Amendment, High School Students, and the
Possibility of Psychological Harm, 27 BuFFALo L. REv. 375, 392-93 (1978).
54. Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973); Shanley v. Northeast Independent Community
School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972); Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ.,
307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238
(E.D.N.Y. 1969).
55. See § IV of text infra.
56. 607 F.2d 1043, 1045.
57. Id. n.3. Chief Judge Kaufman's majority opinion stated that the publication
was "saturated with distasteful sexual satire." Id. Judge Newman, in his con-
currence in the result, called the language employed in the publication "inde-
cent and vulgar" for persons of school age. He added that "[t] he pages of the
federal reports will not be enriched by ... repetition [of the language used].
The students responsible for the publication proudly labeled it 'vulgar'. This
was not false advertising." Id. at 1054 (Newman, J., concurring in the result).
[Vol. 59:790
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article was typed or written in the school building, but after school
hours. Sometimes the students asked a teacher for advice on
grammar and content. After a school official learned of the publi-
cation while it was in its preparatory stages, the students were
warned to keep the publication away from the school and to avoid
the use of the names of students and teachers and material that
would hurt persons connected with the school. The students, after
this warning, deleted some names and articles, and sought to sever
any tangible connections with the school.58
A local shop printed Hard Times and the copies were stored in
a teacher's classroom closet by permission of the instructor. At
the end of each day, the students removed copies of the publica-
tion and sold them to classmates at a store in Granville rather than
on the school grounds.59 The court noted that the student editors
refused to sell copies to junior high school students. 60 After most
of the copies had been sold, a teacher noticed that a Granville high
school student had a copy in his possession while at school, confis-
cated it, and presented it to the school's principal. The principal
and the superintendent of schools agreed that they should take no
action until the impact of the publication could be assessed. How-
ever, after the president of the Granville Board of Education
learned of Hard Times through her son and expressed her shock,
the principal began an investigation-five days after the copy had
been confiscated.6 '
The principal and superintendent decided to suspend the stu-
dent editors from school for five days.62 In a letter to the students'
parents, the principal stated that the suspensions were based on
the production of a "morally offensive, indecent, and obscene"
publication. 63 For the court, this was sufficient to demonstrate that
the principal was making no attempt to base the suspensions on
insubordination connected with acts occurring on school
grounds.64 After the suspensions took effect, the students, through
their parents, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declara-
tory and injunctive relief from alleged deprivations of first and
58. Id. at 1045.
59. Id.
60. Id. n.2.
61. Id. at 1045-46.
62. The school officials decided that the five-day suspension would be reduced to
three days if the students each wrote an essay dealing with the potential
harm of "irresponsible and/or obscene writing." Id. at 1046. Additionally, the
students were to be segregated from other students in study halls for at least
a month, they were to lose all student privileges during the period of suspen-
sion, and suspension letters were to be included in their files. Id. The essay
requirement was later enjoined by the district judge. Id.




fourteenth amendment rights. 65 In the district court, preliminary
injunctive relief was denied, the court determining that the plain-
tiffs had not shown a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits
and that the publication was not protected by the first amendment
because it was potentially damaging to school discipline.66 A re-
quest for permanent injunctive relief was also denied by the dis-
trict court, and the students lodged their appeal.67
IV. THE DECISION IN THOMAS
A. Analysis
The Second Circuit noted that the typing of a few Hard Times
articles on school typewriters and the storing of the publication in
a teacher's closet were insufficient to "alter the fact that Hard
Times was conceived, executed, and distributed outside the
school. At best, therefore, any activity within the school itself was
de minimis.' '68 While the court recognized that the defendant
school officials disclaimed the desire to punish the students for
any off-campus expression, it observed that by basing the suspen-
sions on the administrators' evaluation of the content of the off-
campus publication rather than on any in-school conduct, 69 the
school officials "ha[d], perhaps inadvertently, overstepped the
boundary line they claim to have created. '70
That the activities in question occurred almost entirely off
school grounds was sufficient, in the court's view, to distinguish
the case at hand from Tinker and most of its progeny,71 and suffi-
cient to make unnecessary any extended discussion of whether
the administrators' actions satisfied the Tinker test. Instead, the
court held that "because school officials have ventured out of the
school yard and into the general community where the freedom
accorded expression is at its zenith, their actions must be evalu-
ated by the principles that bind government officials in the public
arena. ' 72 Because only an "independent, impartial deci-
sionmaker 73 could have imposed the punishments meted out in
this case, the failure of the administrators to satisfy that standard
made the suspensions violative of the first amendment.7 4 The chil-
65. Id. at 1046.
66. Thomas v. Board of Educ., 478 F. Supp. 114, 123-24 (N.D.N.Y. 1979).
67. 607 F.2d at 1046, 1047.
68. Id. at 1050 (footnote omitted).
69. See notes 63-64 & accompanying text supra.
70. 607 F.2d at 1050 n.12.
71. Id. at 1050.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74 Id. The court's basis for decision made it unnecessary to determine whether
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ling effect resulting from the punishment of students engaging in
strictly limited categories of speech within the school could, ac-
cording to the court, be tolerated constitutionally, but the levying
of sanctions for off-campus expression could not be.75 Accordingly,
a reversal of the district court's decision and a remand to that court
for the entering of appropriate relief were necessary 7 6
The Thomas decision is founded upon a basic philosophy that
the disciplinary actions of a public school administrator should be
evaluated according to standards which allow some deference to
the administrator's expertise only if "the arm of [administrative]
authority does not reach beyond the schoolhouse gate. ' 77 Once a
school official attempts, consciously or inadvertently,78 to regulate
activity taking place in the general community and having only a
minimal connection with the school, he becomes subject to princi-
ples binding government officials in the community at large.7 9 The
court's position that the school officials constitutionally could not
have punished the students since any "violations" occurred not in
the school but in the public arena,80 "rests upon a fundamental ax-
iom-speech may not be suppressed nor any speaker punished un-
less the final determination that [the speech is] unprotected is
made by an impartial, independent decisionmaker."8 1 In support
of this statement, the court cited cases such as Freedman v. Mary-
land82 and Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad.83 Recogniz-
ing that Freedman and Southeastern Promotions arose in the
context of prior restraints, the court nevertheless found their prin-
ciples and rationales appropriate to cases involving subsequent
punishment, especially punishment stemming from informal ad-
ministrative settings.84 The assertion that an independent deci-
sionmaker is necessary in a case arising in a factual context such
as that of Thomas becomes notably stronger because of the likeli-
hood that the publication would include negative statements about
the school or about the very administrators who would be seeking
to punish the students involved.8 5
Hard Times was obscene. The school officials claimed it to be obscene at the
time the suspensions were ordered and still claimed it to be such at oral argu-
ment on appeal. Id. at 1050-51 n.13.
75. Id. at 1051.
76. Id. at 1052-53.
77. Id. at 1044-45.
78. See notes 63-64 & accompanying text supra.
79. 607 F.2d at 1050.
80. See note 75 & accompanying text supra.
81. 607 F.2d at 1048.
82. 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
83. 420 U.S. 546, 561 (1975).
84. 607 F.2d at 1048 n.8.
85. See Letwin, supra note 29, at 186-87.
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In coming to its decision, the Thomas court did not treat in any
depth the few cases which had considered the propriety of school
officials' punishing students for off-campus expression.8 6 The first
amendment was also found to have been violated in a Fifth Circuit
case, Shanley v. Northeast Independent Community School Dis-
trict.87 Since the underground newspaper in Shanley was pro-
duced entirely outside school, no school materials were used,
distribution occurred before and after school and near, but not on,
school grounds, and there was no disruption in school traceable to
the distribution,88 suspensions of the students involved for their
failure to comply with an "approval prior to distribution" policy vi-
olated the first amendment.89 The Shanley opinion included a dis-
cussion of the Tinker test,9 0 taking the common sense approach
that any authority that school officials might have to regulate off-
campus speech clearly could not exceed their authority to regulate
on-campus speech.91 The Shanley court was careful to point out,
however, that its holding did not mean that any attempt by school
officials to regulate expression occurring off-campus and after
school hours was automatically unconstitutional. 92 Shanley, then,
did not foreclose the possibility that a school administrator could
constitutionally regulate some off-campus expression.
A result contrary to that in Thomas was reached in Baker v.
Downey City Board of Education,93 in which two high school se-
niors had been suspended for the use of what school officials called
"profanity and vulgarity" in a publication produced off-campus and
distributed to students just outside the main gate of the school.94
The action taken by the school officials was held a reasonable exer-
cise of their power and discretion in the maintenance of an atmos-
phere conducive to learning.95
The Baker court noted that there was some evidence of disrup-
tion of classes which could be traced to students' possession of and
86. See Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973); Shanley v. Northeast Independent Commu-
nity School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972); Baker v. Downey City Bd. of
Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238
(E.D.N.Y. 1969).
87. 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972).
88. Id. at 964.
89. Id. at 975. The court observed that the publication included nothing obscene,
libelous, or inflammatory, and that as underground papers go, it was "proba-
bly one of the most vanilla-flavored ever to reach a federal court." Id. at 964.
90. Id. at 970, 974.
91. Id. at 968.
92. Id. at 974.
93. 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
94. Id. at 519.
95. Id. at 525.
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preoccupation with the publication.9 6 Tinker was cited 97 but the
court did not clarify whether it was to serve as the standard. For
the Baker court, it did not seem significant that the production and
distribution occurred entirely off-campus. The students were re-
garded as having intended that the publication be well-circulated
in the school, since they handed out copies just outside the school
gate.98 The court went on to note, in sweeping language, that
"when the bounds of decency are violated in publications distrib-
uted to high school students, whether on campus or off campus,
the offenders become subject to discipline." 99 The reasoning in
Thomas casts grave doubts on the validity of such a broad state-
ment. 0 0
In view of the Thomas court's effort to distinguish the facts
before it from those of Tinker on the ground that Tinker involved
on-campus expression and Thomas dealt with what was for all
practical purposes off-campus expression,101 a conclusion which
could be drawn is that the Tinker standard of material and sub-
stantial disruption, or a reasonable forecast of it, does not apply in
cases involving expression which takes place off the school
grounds. Similarly, it would appear to follow from the Thomas
facts and holding that where the acts of expression are primarily
off-campus acts but there is a minimal connection with the school,
Tinker again should not be applied. Presumably if the connection
with school was more than de minimis and tended to predominate
over the off-campus aspects of the expression, the Tinker analysis
would become appropriate.
While the foregoing theories logically can be derived from
Thomas, it is not entirely clear whether the court would have felt
itself so free to distinguish Tinker had it been faced with a differ-
96. Id. at 522.
97. Id. at 521.
98. Id. at 526.
99. Id.
100. Two other cases, Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973), and Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F.
Supp. 238 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), involved off-campus distribution of publications.
The students' suspensions in those cases were upheld on grounds apart from
the distribution of the publication and akin to insubordination: the use of
profanity in addressing school officials and the violation of school regulations
in Sullivan, 475 F.2d at 1075-76, and flagrant disobedience of school authori-
ties in Schwartz, 298 F. Supp. at 241. Therefore, these cases are different from
Thomas in that in Thomas, the suspensions were based on the off-campus
activity. While Judge Newman, in his concurrence in the result in Thomas,
cited Sullivan as authority for disciplining students for off-campus distribu-
tion where circulation on campus was intended, 607 F.2d at 1058 n.13 (New-
man, J., concurring in the result), a close analysis of the case reveals that it
should not be cited for that proposition.
101. 607 F.2d at 1050.
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ent factual context-such as off-campus expression which did sub-
stantially disrupt the school environment or posed a serious threat
of doing so. Under such facts, the Tinker standard conceivably
could have been found appropriate and the figurative placement of
a barrier at the edge of the school grounds to stop overzealous
school officials (or their counterparts who inadvertently might
cross the line of impermissible regulation 102 ) might not have been
seen as necessary, or even desirable. The court conceded the pos-
sibility that such a factual context might have necessitated a differ-
ent analysis:
We can, of course, envision a case in which a group of students incites
substantial disruption within the school from some remote locale. We
need not, however, address this scenario because, on the facts before us,
there was simply no threat or forecast of material and substantial disrup-
tion within the school.
10 3
The court stressed that the Granville administrators did nothing
for nearly a week after discovering the nature of the publication
and made no showing of actual disruption within the school or
facts providing a reasonable basis for the forecast of such disrup-
tion. The suspensions were predicated on the administrators' be-
lief that Hard Times was "morally offensive, indecent, and
obscene, 10 4 not on actual or potential disruption.105 The conclu-
sion which should be drawn is that while the Tinker analysis did
not fit under the particular facts of Thomas, Tinker is not necessar-
ily inapplicable to all factual scenarios involving essentially off-
campus expression.10 6
In justifying the limitation of the autonomy of school officials to
the school and the school day, 0 7 the court stressed that school ad-
ministrators could not be given the opportunity to win public ap-
proval by imposing sanctions on students engaging in off-campus
expression. School officials inclined to act in such a manner
would, as would well-meaning administrators who exceeded their
sphere of authority, impermissibly chill the exercise of protected
freedoms. 108 In emphasizing that school officials with unchecked
power to regulate off-campus expression might inhibit future
expression by placing sanctions on protected speech, the court
102. See notes 63-64 & accompanying text supra.
103. 607 F.2d at 1052 n.17.
104. Id. at 1050 n.12. See notes 63-64 & accompanying text supra.
105. 607 F.2d at 1052 n.17.
106. While the Thomas court appeared to reserve the option of applying the
Tinker analysis to certain cases involving off-campus expression, see note 103
& accompanying text supra, it failed to offer guidelines sufficient to enable
one to devise, with certainty, a hypothetical off-campus expression case to
which Tinker clearly would be applied.
107. Id. at 1052.
108. Id. at 1051.
[Vol. 59:790
FIRST AMENDMENT
resorted to a logical extremes analysis. It stated that if the officials
possessed the kind of power they attempted to assert in the case of
Hard Times, they could punish a student who purchased a copy of
National Lampoon10 9 and loaned it to a friend attending the same
school, or a student who viewed an X-rated film while on his own
time." 0 While one cannot deny the significance of the basic point
that there would be a constitutionally impermissible risk in ac-
cording school administrators wide-ranging authority to punish
the exercise of expression regardless of where it occurs, the court's
use of the logical extremes approach"' does appear to stretch be-
lievability. There is a clear distinction between the expression in-
volved in Thomas and the viewing of an X-rated movie away from
school grounds. The distinction lies in the connection-though ad-
mittedly minimal-which Hard Times had with the school and the
complete lack of connection between the viewing of an X-rated
movie and the school environment. Additionally, it is difficult to
envision a rational school official attempting to punish a student
for viewing such a movie. While the punishments imposed in
Thomas were admittedly unconstitutional, it is not so difficult to
see what prompted the administrators to follow a course of con-
duct which they felt was justified but must be regarded as imper-
missible. n 2
B. The Concurrence in the Result
Judge Newman concurred in the result because he agreed that
punishment had improperly been imposed for essentially off-cam-
pus activity." 3 He concluded, however, that the majority had ig-
nored half of the case, stating that the students sought relief that
would allow them to distribute Hard Times on school property.114
The majority did not decide whether the school could regulate on-
campus distribution of the publication, since it thought the stu-
dents had, on appeal, abandoned any claim to such relief.n
109. As previously indicated, National Lampoon served as the inspiration for
Hard Times. See note 56 & accompanying text supra.
110. 607 F.2d at 1051.
111. This approach is utilized to illustrate that a given principle, once recognized,
would, when stretched to its logical extremes, produce illogical results. For a
resort to logical and illogical extremes reasoning similar to that employed in
Thomas, see Shanley v. Northeast Independent Community School Dist., 462
F.2d at 977.
112. For an expression of views similar to these, see 607 F.2d at 1058 n.13 (New-
man, J., concurring in the result).
113. 607 F.2d at 1053 (Newman, J., concurring in the result).
114. Id. at 1054.
115. Id. at 1052 n.18.
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The thesis of Judge Newman is that Cohen v. California116 and
Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation,117
coupled with cases such as Ginsberg v. New York,118 establish the
principle that school officials constitutionally may prohibit on-cam-
pus distribution of publications which, while not obscene,119 in-
clude language which is "indisputably indecent."'120 For Judge
Newman, "the First Amendment gives a high school student the
classroom right to wear Tinker's armband, but not Cohen's jack-
et."12' He suggested that the Tinker standard, normally given sub-
stantial weight in cases involving administrative approval prior to
distribution of the material,122 should not be applied in a distribu-
tion case involving a publication which contains indecent lan-
guage.123
116. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Cohen involved the reversal of a conviction for disturbing
the peace where the statute as applied was an impermissible regulation of
speech. Id. at 26. Cohen had walked through a courthouse corridor wearing a
jacket which bore the inscription "Fuck the Draft." Id. at 16. It was held that
the display of a four-letter word could not be made a criminal offense. Id. at
26. Judge Newman cited Cohen for the proposition that one does not have an
absolute right to express himself as he chooses, when he chooses and wher-
ever he chooses. 607 F.2d at 1055 (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. at 19). It must be
remembered, however, that Cohen's speech was held protected.
117. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). This case arose out of a radio station's playing, during the
middle of the afternoon, a recording of the George Carlin comedy monologue
"Filthy Words." Id. at 729. In upholding the FCC's authority to impose sanc-
tions on broadcasting stations which aired broadcasts which were not ob-
scene but included "indecent" language, id. at 738, the Supreme Court
expressed grave concern over the accessibility of such language to children
in the audience. It appeared to authorize the withholding of some forms of
offensive expression from children. Id. at 749. Professor Tribe regards
Pacifica as an unfortunate aberration ultimately to be discarded before it
leaves any significant impact on first amendment doctrine. L. TRIBE, supra
note 6, at 67-68 (1979 Supp.).
118. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Ginsberg established the principle that the state has the
constitutional power to regulate in order to protect the well-being of minors.
Id. at 638.
119. The constitutional obscenity standards are set out in Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973). The term "obscenity" applies to works describing or depicting
sexual conduct. The standard to be applied by the trier of fact is whether an
average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find
that: (1) the work, taken as a whole, appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (2)
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
which is specifically defined by applicable state law; and (3) the work as a
whole is lacking in serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Id. at
24.
120. 607 F.2d at 1057.
121. Id.
122. See notes 36-47 & accompanying text supra.
123. 607 F.2d at 1055. While the majority did not decide whether the school offi-
cials could regulate on-campus distribution of Hard Times because it felt that
the students were no longer pursuing such a claim, see notes 114-15 & accom-
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In addition, Judge Newman expressed the position that in a
case in which the Tinker standard of a reasonable forecast of sub-
stantial interference is met, school authority may be exercised
against off-campus activity, "territoriality... not necessarily [be-
ing] a useful concept in determining the limit of [school officials']
authority."' 24
V. CONCLUSION
While it would not appear wise to read Thomas v. Board of Edu-
cation as standing for the proposition that school officials may
never regulate off-campus expression,125 the basic tenor of the de-
cision is encouraging. The hesitancy in Thomas to allow adminis-
trators to venture into the general community and thereby chill
the exercise of protected rights of expression (including the right
to express oneself in a manner which some might not approve of)
is judicial recognition that students' first amendment rights cannot
be sacrificed merely because some figures of authority claim the
abrogation of freedoms to be necessary or desirable. By walking
through the schoolhouse gate and entering the school, students of
necessity sacrifice some of the expansiveness characteristic of
their rights of expression. When they again walk through the
schoolhouse gate and leave the school grounds, the previously sac-
rificed expansiveness must be regained if the first amendment
guarantee is to retain its vitality.
Arlen W. Langvardt '81
panying text supra, it did, in dicta, offer criticisms of Judge Newman's ap-
proach. 607 F.2d at 1052-53 n.18.
124. Id. at 1058 n.13.
125. See notes 101-06 & accompanying text supra.
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